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Abstract
We investigate unemployment due to mismatch in the United States over the
past three and a half decades. We propose an accounting framework that allows
us to estimate the contribution of each of the frictions that generated labor mar-
ket mismatch. Barriers to job mobility account for the largest part of mismatch
unemployment, with a smaller role for barriers to worker mobility. We nd little
contribution of wage-setting frictions to mismatch.
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1 Introduction
After the end of the Great Recession in December 2007, unemployment in the United
States remained high for more than half a decade. One explanation that was suggested
is a mismatch in the skills or geographic location of the available jobs and workers, a
view that seemed to be supported by a decline in aggregate matching e¢ ciency (Elsby,
Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010), Barnichon and Figura (2010)) and geographic mobility (Frey
(2009)). Direct estimates using disaggregated data conrm that mismatch rose in the
recession (S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014)). However, the literature o¤ers little
insight into the reasons for this increase.
In this paper, we estimate mismatch unemployment on the U.S. labor market from
1979 to 2015, and we explore what frictions caused mismatch to arise. To do so, we use
a model to derive an accounting framework that puts just enough structure on the data
to allow us to quantify the sources of mismatch unemployment.
The labor market in our model consists of multiple submarkets or segments. Mis-
match is dened as ine¢ cient dispersion in labor market conditions, in particular the
job-nding rate, across labor market segments. Within segments, frictions prevent the
instantaneous matching of unemployed workers to vacant jobs, resulting in search unem-
ployment in the tradition of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985).
Across segments, frictions generate dispersion in labor market conditions, which gives
rise to mismatch unemployment.1
Three types of frictions generate mismatch: worker-mobility costs, job-mobility costs,
and wage-setting frictions. Worker-mobility frictions prevent an unemployed worker in
one submarket from taking up a job in a di¤erent submarket. For example, if we think
of labor market segments as occupations, worker-mobility frictions might prevent an
unemployed construction worker from nding a job as a retail sales representative, a
displaced steelworker from lling a vacancy for a nurse, or an unemployed engineer to
take up a job as a lawyer. In these examples, worker mobility frictions take the form
of training costs and occupational licensing. If we think of labor market segments as
states, regions or commuting zones, frictions may also take the form of moving costs,
etc. Job-mobility frictions prevent rms from substituting positions (e.g., onsite techni-
cians) in submarkets where labor is scarce with di¤erent positions (e.g., online customer
support representatives) for which the supply of workers is more abundant. We think of
1The denition of mismatch as a deviation from an e¢ cient allocation follows the recent empirical
literature, in particular S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014). Although not directly related, this
denition is also consistent with the theoretical literature. Shimer (2007) shows that mismatch between
the distributions of workers and jobs over segments of the labor market gives rise to a relationship between
the job-nding probability and labor-market tightness that is very similar to the relationship obtained if
there are search frictions and an aggregate matching function. Stock-ow matching, as in Coles, Jones,
and Smith (2010); rest unemployment, as in Alvarez and Shimer (2011); reallocation unemployment
as in Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013), Wong (2012) or Chang (2011); waiting unemployment as in
Birchenall (2011); mismatch unemployment as in Wiczer (2013); and move unemployment as in Pilossoph
(2014) are all closely related to this concept of unemployment due to mismatch. As opposed to these
studies, the focus of our paper is empirical. One way to think about the contribution of this paper is to
provide a set of facts that can be used to test the theoretical models of mismatch unemployment.
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these frictions as rigidities in the production technology, or as barriers to entry in par-
ticular occupations or industries. Both of these frictions may explain why a situation
of mismatch between the distribution of vacancies and unemployed workers over sub-
markets can persist. Wage-setting frictions prevent the wage from reecting the relative
abundance or shortage of workers in di¤erent submarkets. This type of friction, which
we could think of as a type of wage rigidity, generates mismatch because (everything
else equal) workers will prefer to look for jobs in submarkets where wages are relatively
high, whereas rms are more inclined to try and recruit in submarkets where wages are
relatively low. As an example, this type of friction might explain why many workers
with engineering backgrounds work in nance, while manufacturing rms nd recruiting
engineers di¢ cult.
Our approach to estimate the sources of mismatch unemployment uses data on job-
and worker-nding rates, and worker and job surplus by labor market segments, which
we operationalize as occupations, states, or industries. We construct these variables
over the 1979-2015 period from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
We argue that mismatch is an important reason for unemployment. Our estimates
show that mismatch across detailed occupations and states is responsible for about a
fth of uctuations in, and for around 13% of the level of unemployment. The cyclical
behavior of mismatch unemployment is very similar to that of the overall unemployment
rate. This nding is driven by the fact that dispersion in labor market conditions across
states and industries moves closely with the business cycle, similar to what Abraham and
Katz (1986) documented over three decades ago.2 The unemployment that derives from
this dispersion is as cyclical as the overall unemployment rate, and no more persistent.
As a corollary, the nature of the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession was
no di¤erent from the increase in previous recessions, although it was, of course, more
severe.3 The absence of a secular trend in mismatch unemployment indicates that the
increase in mismatch unemployment was not structural, in the sense that it would
not respond to stabilization policy.4
2 In response to the structural shifts viewof recessions put forward by Lilien (1982), which holds
that recessions are periods of reallocation between industries, Abraham and Katz showed that aggregate
shocks can give rise to countercyclical uctuations in dispersion of employment growth across sectors.
3This result is not inconsistent with the observation that there was an outward shift in the Beveridge
curve, the negatively sloped relationship between vacancies and unemployment, which indicates a decline
in aggregate matching e¢ ciency and provides much of the basis for the argument that there was an
unprecedented increase in mismatch in the Great Recession (Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010), Lubik
(2013)). While an increase in mismatch indeed reduces matching e¢ ciency (Shimer (2007)), there are
many other causes for shifts in the Beveridge curve as well, including changes in the separation rate and
demographics. Controlling for these factors, the remaining role for mismatch is very small (Barnichon
and Figura (2010)). For the same reason, our ndings do not contradict the observation that exogenous
shocks to mismatch are not an important as a source of unemployment uctuations (Furlanetto and
Groshenny (2016)).
4 In the wake of the Great Recession, this was a widely held view, advocated most prominently by
Narayana Kocherlakota (2010), the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, who argued
that it is hard to see how the Fed can do much to cure this problem. Monetary stimulus has provided
conditions so that manufacturing plants want to hire new workers. But the Fed does not have a means
to transform construction workers into manufacturing workers. See Estevão and Tsounta (2011) and
3
Our most interesting and novel set of results concerns the sources of labor market
mismatch. We nd that almost all mismatch is caused by barriers to worker and job
mobility, and that the latter are much more important than the former. Little or no
mismatch is due to wage-setting frictions. These conclusions are based on testing the
strong predictions generated by our framework for the patterns we should observe in the
data in the absence of the various frictions that can give rise to mismatch. In particular,
if there are no barriers to worker mobility, a no-arbitrage condition dictates that we
should see a negative correlation between wages (measuring how attractive it is to have
a job in a given state or industry) and job-nding rates (how hard it is to nd these
jobs). We indeed nd this correlation in the data.
The early empirical literature on mismatch focused on shifts in the Beveridge curve,
trying to use aggregate data to estimate matching e¢ ciency (Lipsey (1965), Abraham
(1987), Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Barnichon and Figura (2010)). Two more
recent contributions use disaggregated data and are closely related to this paper. S¸ahin,
Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) use data on unemployment and vacancies by counties,
occupations, and industries (from the JOLTS and the HWOL data for the 2001-2011
and 2005-2011 periods, respectively), to construct indices of mismatch. Barnichon and
Figura (2015) use the CPS to explore how much dispersion in labor market conditions
contributes to movements in matching e¢ ciency.5 The contribution of this paper is the
accounting framework that allows us to decompose mismatch into its sources, and to
estimate the contribution of each of these sources to unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we dene mismatch as any
deviation from the allocation chosen by a planner who can freely allocate vacancies and
unemployed workers across submarkets of the labor market; we also set up the model
environment to implement this denition. In Section 3, we show how the competitive
equilibrium of this model can be used to decompose mismatch into the di¤erent sources of
ine¢ cient dispersion in job-nding rates. We identify three sources of mismatch: worker-
mobility costs, job-mobility costs and wage-setting frictions. Section 4 presents the
details of our proposed mismatch accountingprocedure and discusses some important
caveats. Section 5 describes the data used in the estimation, and explains in detail
how we construct the empirical counterparts of the variables that dene a labor market
segment in our model. Finally, Section 6 presents the empirical results and Section 7
concludes.
Groshen and Potter (2003) for versions of this argument. Early critics include Krugman (2010), DeLong
(2010), P. and Spletzer (2012), and Peter Diamond (2011), who notes in his Nobel lecture that there is a
long history of claims that the latest technological or structural developments make for a new, long-term,
high level of unemployment, but these have repeatedly been proven wrong.(p.1065). Kocherlakota later
changed his views in light of the evidence (New York Times (2014)).
5Another related recent paper is Herz (2017), who examines the role of skill mismatch for unemploy-
ment using micro-data on displaced workers. If no vacancies matching a displaced workers skill set are
currently available, she can either ll a vacancy for a job she is not trained for, and su¤er a wage loss as
a result; or she can wait until until a more suitable vacancy opens up. Herz empirically examines this
trade-o¤ using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, and nds that such wait unemployment accounts
for a substantial part of aggregate unemployment.
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2 Mismatch
We dene mismatch, following S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), as any deviation
from the allocation of unemployed workers and vacancies over labor market segments
that a social planner would choose. Mismatch unemployment is unemployment that
arises due to this mismatch, i.e., the di¤erence between actual unemployment and un-
employment in the social planner allocation. We show that, under some conditions,
a social planner would equalize job-nding probabilities across labor market segments.
Under these conditions, mismatch unemployment can be equivalently dened as unem-
ployment due to dispersion in job-nding rates.
2.1 Model Environment
Consider a labor market that consists of segments indicated by i. The idea is that
each unemployed worker cannot match with each vacancy. A segment, or submarket, is
dened as the subset of jobs that a given unemployed worker searches for, or the subset
of unemployed workers that can form a match with a given vacancy.
There are nit workers employed in segment i at time t, who produce output us-
ing a production technology that requires only labor f (nit; zit), where zit is a produc-
tion e¢ ciency shifter, which may vary across segments. Each labor market segment
is subject to frictions in the tradition of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pis-
sarides (1985). Job matches are formed from uit unemployed workers and vit vacan-
cies using a constant-returns-to-scale matching technology m (uit; vit;it) = itu

itv
1 
it ,
with 0 <  < 1 and where it is a matching e¢ ciency shifter, which determines the
job-nding and vacancy-lling probabilities pit = m (uit; vit;it) =uit = it (vit=uit)
1 
and qit = m (uit; vit;it) =vit = it (vit=uit)
 . Matches are destroyed with an exoge-
nous probability i in each period, so that employment in each segment evolves as
nit+1 = (1  i)nit +m (uit; vit;it).
Unemployed workers engage in home production in the amount of bit and workers
not participating in the labor force produce u, which includes any unemployment and
welfare benets and utility from leisure. Vacancies cost g (vit;it) in each period, where
it is a vacancy cost shifter, and there is an additional opportunity cost v of keeping
a position open, whether lled or unlled, which we may think of as the revenue from
renting out the capital associated with the position if it is closed (set v = 0 to represent
free entry of vacancies). The segment-specic shocks zit, it, bit and it all follow
exogenous Markov processes. Workers have linear utility over consumption only,6 and
discount future periods at rate  = 1= (1 + r).
6For simplicity. The e¢ cient and equilibrium allocations are unchanged if we assume instead that
households consisting of many workers share risk between their members. Utility from leisure is included
in home production bit and u.
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2.2 E¢ cient Allocation of Unemployed and Vacancies
The social planner allocates unemployed workers and vacancies over labor market seg-
ments to maximize the expected net present value of utility of the representative worker,
which is equivalent to maximizing the expected net present value of output net of vacancy
costs
X
i
f (nit; zit) + bituit g (vit;it) +u (1  nit   uit) +v (1  nit   vit), subject to
the evolution of employment in each segment under the matching technology.
In appendix A.1, we show that the social planner chooses an allocation that satises
the following e¢ ciency condition,
pit = it

1  

u   bit
v + g0 (vit;it)
1 
(1)
where pit = it (vit=uit)
1  is the job-nding probability in segment i at time t, and
 is the unemployment share parameter in the matching function, m (uit; vit;it) =
itu

itv
1 
it .
A version of e¢ ciency condition (1) may be found in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante
(2014), who assume the production function is linear but that vacancy posting costs
increase with the amount of vacancies in a segment. If we set f (nit; zit) = zitnit and
g (vit;it) = (1= (1 + "))
"
itv
1+"
it , then (1) reduces to (A36) in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and
Violante (2014), see appendix A.1.7
2.3 Dispersion in Labor Market Conditions and Mismatch
If home production, vacancy costs and matching e¢ ciency are homogeneous, bit = bt,
g0 (vit;it) = t and it = t, then condition (1) prescribes that in the e¢ cient alloca-
tion the job-nding probability must be equal in all labor market segments, pit = pt.
Furthermore, the planner allocates more vacancies and unemployed workers to segments
where productivity is high, so that the expected net present value of the marginal prod-
uct of labor is equal as well, see appendix A.1.4.8 This is our benchmark allocation with
full equalization of labor market conditions.9
7 If the vacancy distribution is exogenous (not under the control of the planner), as in the baseline of
S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), condition (1) is replaced by,
mu (uit; vit;it)Sit = 
u   bit (2)
where Sit is the expected net present value of the marginal productivity of labor f 0 (nit; zit), which equals
(zit   u   v) = (r + i) if we further assume that the production function is linear and productivity zit
follows a random walk (derivation in appendix A.1). This is condition (2) in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and
Violante (2014).
8We need decreasing returns in production function f (nit; zit) for this result. This is a reasonable
assumption if production requires not only labor but also capital, which may be harder to adjust than
employment.
9 If vacancies are exogenous, but in addition to home productivity bit = bt and matching e¢ ciency
it = t, market productivity and separation rates are homogeneous as well, zit = zt and i =  so that
Sit = St, then (2) states that in the e¢ cient allocation the marginal contribution of unemployment to
job matches mu;it (uit; vit;it) must be equalized. In this case, which is condition (1) in S¸ahin, Song,
Topa, and Violante (2014), the job-nding probability is equalized as well.
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There are two reasons for dispersion in labor market conditions: parameter het-
erogeneity and mismatch. Heterogeneity in the parameters bit (productivity of home
production of the unemployed), it (vacancy maintenance costs), and it (matching ef-
ciency), generates e¢ cient dispersion in job-nding rates. In the empirical part of this
paper, we try to control for heterogeneity in these parameters, as described in Section 4.2
below. Mismatch is dened as deviations from condition (1), i.e., ine¢ cient deviations
from the benchmark of fully equalized labor market conditions.
3 Sources of Mismatch
In this Section, we solve for an equilibrium of the model described in Section 2.1 above,
in which there are no frictions other than the search friction as in Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). We will show that the allocation of unem-
ployed workers and vacancies in this equilibrium is the same as the e¢ cient allocation
and therefore refer to this equilibrium as the no-mismatch equilibrium. The equilib-
rium conditions can be used to decompose mismatch, i.e., deviations from the e¢ cient
no-mismatch equilibrium allocation, into the contribution of three di¤erent types of
frictions: barriers to the mobility of workers between labor market segments, barriers to
the mobility of vacancies between segments, and ine¢ cient wage dispersion. Below, we
describe the equilibrium conditions in words. The derivations may be found in appendix
A.2.
3.1 Worker Mobility
If unemployed workers are free to move between labor market segments, then they
must be indi¤erent about the labor market in which they will search for a job; this is
described by the following equilibrium condition, see appendix A.2.1, which we call the
worker-mobility condition.
pitS
W
it = 
u   bit (3)
SWit is the surplus that is expected to realize for a worker who is allocated to segment i if
she nds a job there in period t, i.e., the expected net present value of wages wit in that
segment. If wages follow a random walk, then SWit = (wit   u) = (r + i) is the value of
an innite stream of (expected) wages wit, net of home production of non-participants,
discounted by the rate of time preference and the probability i that the worker loses
the job again.
Intuitively, worker-mobility condition (3) is a no-arbitrage condition. In the absence
of parameter heterogeneity, bit = bt, it states that attractive jobs must be hard to nd,
and unattractive jobs easy to nd.10 If home productivity bit di¤ers across segments,
10The insight is the same as that of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model of rural-urban migration.
In the context of worker mobility, it should not be surprising that some (urban) areas have much
lower job-nding rates (higher unemployment) if wages are much higher there. Similarly, Montgomery
(1991) proposes di¤erences in job-nding rates as an explanation for persistent wage di¤erentials across
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then segments with high home productivity must have low job-nding rates or low
worker surplus, or both.
3.2 Job Mobility
If rms can freely relocate vacancies across labor market segments, a no-arbitrage condi-
tion holds that is similar to the worker-mobility condition above. We call this condition
the job-mobility condition.Let qit = m (uit; vit;t) =vit be the probability that a rm
lls a vacancy in segment i in period t. Then, as derived in appendix A.2.2,
qitS
F
it = 
v + g0 (vit;it) (4)
where SFit is the surplus a rm realizes when its vacancy in segment i is lled in period
t, i.e. the expected net present value of prots. If prots follow a random walk, then
SFit = (f
0 (nit; zit)  wit   v) = (r + i).
In the absence of heterogeneity, e.g., if g0 (vit;it) = it = t, vacancies in segments
where jobs are expected to generate large prots must be hard to ll, and vacancies
in low-prot segments must be easy to ll. With heterogeneity, vacancies in segments
with high vacancy-maintenance costs must be easy to ll or expected to generate high
prots or both. As in the social planner problem, the opportunity cost of creating more
vacancies in total v equals zero if the rm is able to freely generate vacancies (i.e., if
there is free entry). This does not change any of the predictions of the model for
dispersion across segments.
3.3 Matching Technology
The job-nding probability pit in worker-mobility condition (3) and the vacancy-lling
probability qit in job-mobility condition (4) are related to each other, because both de-
pend on the vacancy-unemployment ratio through matching technology. For our Cobb-
Douglas matching function,m (uit; vit;it) = itu

itv
1 
it , we get that pit = t (vit=uit)
1 
and qit = t (vit=uit)
 , which implies
pitq
1 
it = it (5)
Di¤erent from the optimality conditions (3) and (4), equilibrium condition (5) is a
technological constraint, which plays the role of the market-clearing condition on a
perfectly competitive labor market in connecting labor supply with labor demand.
In the absence of parameter heterogeneity, it = t, the job-nding probability and
the job-lling probability are inversely related to each other. With heterogeneity, both
probabilities are higher in segments with high matching e¢ ciency, and lower in segments
with low matching e¢ ciency. If the elasticity of the matching function  is not constant
industries.
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across segments, then condition (5) still holds in rst order approximation. In this case,
dispersion around the condition reects heterogeneity in it as well as it.
3.4 Wage Determination
Worker mobility depends on the surplus of a job that accrues to the worker SWit , see
(3). Job mobility depends on the surplus that accrues to the rm SFit , see (4). Thus, to
close the model we need to specify how the total surplus of a match is divided between
worker and rm. In the no-mismatch equilibrium, we assume the wage is set such that
the worker gets a share  of total match surplus, where  is the unemployment share
parameter in the matching technology.
SWit

=
SFit
1   (6)
This surplus-sharing rule can be justied as the outcome of a Nash bargaining process,
where the bargaining power of workers satises the Hosios (1990) condition. Under this
wage-setting condition, the equilibrium is e¢ cient, see below equation (11) in Section
3.5.
3.5 No-Mismatch Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions are all log-linear in the endogenous variables of the model
pit, qit, SWit and S
F
it . It is convenient, therefore, to write the equilibrium conditions in
logs, using a tilde over a variable to denote its logarithm, ~Xit = logXit. Taking logs of
conditions (3), (4), (5) and (6), we can summarize the equilibrium with the following
four conditions,
~pit + ~S
W
it = 
WM
it (7)
~qit + ~S
F
it = 
JM
it (8)

1  ~pit + ~qit = 
MT
it (9)
~SWit   ~SFit = WD (10)
where WMit = log (
u   bit), JMit = log (v + g0 (vit;it)), MTit = (1= (1  )) log it
and WD = log (= (1  )) so that heterogeneity in WMit , JMit and MTit reects
heterogeneity in home productivity, vacancy costs and matching e¢ ciency, respectively.
Solving this system of equations, we get an explicit expression for segment-specic
job nding probabilities in equilibrium.
~pit = (1  )
 
WMit   JMit + MTit   WD

(11)
Substituting the denitions of WMit , 
JM
it and 
MT
it and 
WD into (11), it is straight-
forward to show that this equilibrium distribution of job-nding probabilities equals the
e¢ cient distribution as in (1).
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As in the e¢ cient allocation, the equilibrium job-nding probabilities are constant
across labor market segments, even if productivity zit, wages wit, and separation proba-
bilities i vary across submarkets, if the crucial parameters home productivity, vacancy
costs and matching e¢ ciency are homogeneous, i.e., if bit = bt, g0 (vit;it) = t and
it = t so that WMit = 
WM
t , 
JM
it = 
JM
t and 
MT
it = 
MT
t . It is straightforward to
show that in this case the vacancy-lling probability qit, and worker and rm surplus
SWit and S
F
it are equalized as well, and the model e¤ectively reduces to a standard search
model with a single, unsegmented labor market.
3.6 Discussion
The no-mismatch equilibrium conditions for worker and job mobility can be interpreted
in various ways. Our preferred interpretation is as no-arbitrage conditions, because that
interpretation allows us to posit the conditions with very few assumptions. However, we
also showed how these conditions can be derived as optimality conditions of, respectively,
a household and a rm in a model of a segmented labor market subject to search frictions
within each segment. Very similar conditions could be derived in the context of a directed
search model as well.
The assumptions we need to derive conditions (7), (8), (9) and (10) are relatively
uncontroversial, so that the framework so far is quite general (we will need to make many
more assumptions to operationalize the procedure, which we discuss in the next section).
One assumption in particular, which does not a¤ect the equilibrium conditions, is worth
mentioning explicitly. We assume that workers and rms can only search in one labor
market segment at the same moment in time. The conditions would be unchanged if
we relax this assumption and assume that workers and rms can distribute search e¤ort
over multiple segments, as long as the total amount of search e¤ort is nite, so that more
intensive search in one segment comes at the cost of reduced search intensity in another
segment. However, in this case our approach will overstate the e¤ect of deviations from
the worker mobility conditions for unemployment, as pointed out by Marinescu and
Rathelot (2016). We return to this issue when we discuss the robustness of our results
in Section 6.4.
In the next section, we discuss our procedure to decompose mismatch unemployment
into its sources using the no-mismatch equilibrium conditions. We want to emphasize
that we are not taking a stance ex-ante on whether or not we expect these conditions to
be satised in the data. These no-mismatch equilibrium conditions are just benchmark
conditions; that is, they are conditions, under which labor market conditions are fully
equalized across segments. Deviations from the benchmark conditions represent sources
of labor market mismatch.
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4 Mismatch Accounting
In general, the distribution of job-nding probabilities across labor market segments may
deviate from the e¢ cient equilibrium, generating mismatch. The equilibrium conditions
allow us to decompose any deviations from the no-mismatch allocation into deviations
from optimality condition (7) for workers, deviations from optimality condition (8) for
rms, or deviations from the e¢ cient surplus-sharing rule (10). We refer to these three
sources of mismatch as worker-mobility frictions, job-mobility frictions, and wage-setting
frictions, and to the decomposition exercise as mismatch accounting. Since condition
(9) is a technological constraint rather than a behavioral equation, we do not anticipate
deviations from this condition other than e¢ cient deviations due to heterogeneity in
matching e¢ ciency.
In this section we describe the implementation of our mismatch accounting proce-
dure. First, we show why it is not possible to identify mismatch from e¢ cient dispersion
in labor market conditions due to parameter heterogeneity without further assumptions.
Then, we describe how we control for parameter heterogeneity by assuming it is time-
invariant, similar to controlling for xed e¤ects in a regression. Third, we discuss how
we can summarize the aggregate e¤ects of labor market mismatch as mismatch unem-
ployment, unemployment that arises due to mismatch or the di¤erence between actual
unemployment and the unemployment rate that would prevail in the social planner
allocation. Finally, we put everything together and then discuss a few caveats and
limitations.
4.1 Frictions and Wedges
If there are other frictions on the labor market than just within-segment search frictions,
then there is no reason why the no-mismatch equilibrium conditions (7), (8) and (10)
should be satised. We can therefore represent such frictions in terms of the deviations
from these conditions observed in the data. We denote these deviations, which we call
wedges following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), by WMit , 
JM
it and 
WD
it . Then,
the equilibrium allocation observed in the data can be written as
~pit + ~S
W
it = 
WM
it + 
WM
it (12)
~qit + ~S
F
it = 
JM
it + 
JM
it (13)

1  ~pit + ~qit = 
MT
it (14)
~SWit   ~SFit = WD + WDit (15)
and the job nding rates across segments are
~pit = (1  )
 
WMit   JMit + MTit   WD + WMit   JMit   WDit

(16)
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The basic idea behind our proposed exercise of mismatch accounting is to measure
the wedges WMit , 
JM
it and 
WD
it from equations (12), (13) and (15), and then use
equation (16) to quantify the contribution of each of the three wedges to dispersion
in job-nding rates. However, since not only wedges WMit , 
JM
it and 
WD
it , but also
parameter heterogeneity, as measured by WMit , 
JM
it and 
MT
it , generate dispersion in
the observables ~pit, ~qit, ~SWit and ~S
F
it , it is not possible to implement this procedure
without more data or further assumptions on the parameter hetorogeneity.
4.2 Heterogeneity
Our identifying assumption is that parameter heterogeneity is constant over time, i.e.,
bit = bi, it = i and it = i, so that WMit = 
WM
i , 
JM
it = 
JM
i and 
MT
it = 
MT
i ,
Under this assumption, we can control for parameter heterogeneity in a way that is
similar in spirit to controlling for xed e¤ects in a regression: by removing the segment-
specic time-series averages from our data.
Let a hat over a variable denote the deviation of its logarithm from the segment-
specic time-series average, i.e. X^it = ~Xit  1T
PT
t=1
~Xit, where T is the nal time period
in the sample. Then, taking deviations from equations (12), (13), (14) and (15), the
allocation observed in the data can be written as,
p^it + S^
W
it = ^
WM
it (17)
q^it + S^
F
it = ^
JM
it (18)

1  p^it + q^it = 0 (19)
S^Wit   S^Fit = ^WDit (20)
because ^WMi = ^
JM
i = ^
MT
i = ^
WD = 0, where ^XXi = 
XX
i   1T
PT
t=1 
XX
i and
^XXit = 
XX
it   1T
PT
t=1 
XX
it .
Solving this system of equations, we get
p^it = (1  )
 
^WMit   ^JMit   ^WDit

(21)
Under our identifying assumption that parameter heterogeneity is constant over time,
all observed dispersion in segment-specic job-nding rates in deviations from their
time-series averages p^it is due to dispersion in the wedges, i.e. to mismatch.
We treat parameter heterogeneity as unobservable, because it is not feasible to con-
vincingly measure heterogeneity in the parameters of our model. Although some data
on these parameters is available, it is likely to be of lower quality than data on pit,
qit, SWit and S
F
it . For example, while there is information on unemployment benets
across states, which is informative about dispersion in bit, we do not have information
on unemployment benets across industries, nor do we have estimates for the dispersion
in the value of leisure across either states or industries. To the best of our knowledge,
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there is no data at all on vacancy maintenance costs or matching e¢ ciency by states or
industries. Our solution is to assume that parameter heterogeneity is time invariant.
Our approach to deal with heterogeneity has advantages as well as disadvantages.
The most obvious disadvantage is that we do not control for time variation in parameter
heterogeneity. It seems reasonable to assume that there is more variation in parameters
across states or industries than within segments over time.11 Nevertheless, if there is
heterogeneous time variation in unemployment benets, vacancy maintenance costs or
matching e¢ ciency, then we will spuriously attribute the dispersion in labor market
conditions that arises because of it to mismatch. In Section 4.4, we discuss to what
extent this bias may a¤ect our results.
A second disadvantage is that, in addition to dispersion due to heterogeneity, we
may also remove dispersion due to mismatch. If di¤erences across submarkets due to
worker-mobility, job-mobility or wage setting frictions are persistent over time, then
some of the dispersion in WMit , 
JM
it and 
WD
it will be removed if we take deviations
from time-series averages. In that sense, our estimates should be viewed as a lower
bound for the contribution of mismatch to aggregate job nding and unemployment.
O¤setting these disadvantages is an important advantage of our approach: in addi-
tion to parameter heterogeneity, the approach also controls for all other time-invariant
heterogeneity, observable as well as unobservable, and across workers as well as across
rms. Heterogeneity across workers and rms is a concern because we estimate the
contribution of mismatch to unemployment from the dispersion in wages, prots, and
nding probabilities. Heterogeneity generates dispersion that is unrelated to mismatch.
Wages, prots and even job-nding rates may vary across workers not only because of
deviations from the no-mismatch equilibrium conditions, but also because workers have
di¤erent education, experience, and other characteristics. Failing to control for these
di¤erences would spuriously attribute the dispersion across labor market segments they
generate to mismatch.12 Residual wage di¤erentials are due at least in part to compen-
sating di¤erentials: non-monetary job amenities such as exible hours or safe working
conditions, in return for which workers are willing to accept lower wages, see Rosen
(1979) and Roback (1982).13 These di¤erences, which are completely unobservable in
our dataset, also generate dispersion that is not ine¢ cient, and, thus, should not be
attributed to mismatch.
11For unemployment benets across states, for which data are available, we nd that 77% of the
variance in the UI replacement ratio is due to variation between states, and the between-state stan-
dard deviation of 0.044 is close to the overall standard deviation of 0.050. Source: UI replacement
ratios (denition 1) by state and year 1997-2017 from the US Department of Labor, available at
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp.
12 In Section 6.4, we show that explicitly controlling for observable worker heterogeneity a¤ects the
results very little, indicating that this heterogeneity is already adequately controlled for in our baseline
results.
13One of these compensating di¤erentials is explicitly taken into account in our calculations, which is
the separation probability. However, this is only one of many di¤erences between jobs.
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4.3 E¤ect of Mismatch on Unemployment
Mismatch unemployment is given by the di¤erence between the actual unemployment
rate and the counterfactual unemployment that would prevail if all wedges were zero.
The wedges generate dispersion in labor market conditions over and above the coun-
terfactual dispersion in the no-mismatch equilibrium. But how does dispersion in labor
market conditions a¤ect the aggregate unemployment rate?
The aggregate unemployment rate is determined by the aggregate separation rate t
and the aggregate job-nding probability pt. Using the approximation that the aggregate
unemployment rate is in steady state given these worker ows, and taking a rst-order
Taylor approximation, we can show that the e¤ect of mismatch on unemployment is
roughly proportional to its e¤ect on the job-nding rate,
ut =
t
t + pt
) log ut   log ut '
pt
t + pt
(log pt   log pt) (22)
where ut and pt denote the counterfactual unemloyment and job-nding rate in the
absence of mismatch. The e¤ect of mismatch on unemployment through the aggregate
separation rate is negligible compared to the e¤ect through the aggregate job-nding
rate for two reasons. First, the rst-order e¤ect through log t   log t is multiplied by
t=
 
t + pt

, which is much smaller than the pt=
 
t + pt

factor multiplying the e¤ect
through the job-nding rate because t << pt in the US data. Second, the aggregate
separation rate t =
P
i init=
P
i nit is not a¤ected by reallocating unemployed workers
and vacancies in the short run, and the long-run e¤ect through changes in the steady-
state distribution of employment nit across segments is small compared to the change
in the aggregate job-nding rate.14
The counterfactual job-nding rate in the absence of mismatch is higher than the
actual job-nding rate, pt > pt, because job-nding rates are concave in vacancy-
unemployment ratios, pit = t
1 
it with 0 <  < 1, so that dispersion in labor market
conditions lowers the average job-nding probability. To get a closed-form expression for
the aggregate e¤ect of mismatch, we assume that the distribution of pit is log-normal.
Under this assumption, the relative contribution of mismatch to the aggregate job-
nding rate is proportional to the dispersion in job-nding rates across labor market
segments,
log pt   log pt = 12

1  V [p^it] (23)
where V [p^it] =
P
i uit (p^it   E [p^it])2

=
P
i uit is the unemployment-weighted variance
of p^it. Equation (23) is very similar to comparable expressions in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and
Violante (2014) and Barnichon and Figura (2015). The derivation is given in appendix
B.
The amount of mismatch unemployment will depend on the level of disaggregation.
14The segment-specic separation probabilities, unlike the segment-specic job-nding probabilities,
are constant, and the weights are a¤ected less simply because nit >> uit for almost all i and t.
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At higher levels of aggregation, we would expect to see substantial mismatch within
segments, so that the observed mismatch across segments is a lower bound for the
actual labor market mismatch. We return to this issue in detail when we discuss our
estimates for mismatch unemployment in Section 6.1.
4.4 Accounting Procedure
The decomposition of mismatch unemployment into its sources is implemented in three
steps. First, we estimate empirical equivalents of the wedges ^WMit , ^
JM
it , ^
WD
it from
equations (17), (18) and (20) using data on the worker and rm surpluses and job-
nding and vacancy-lling rates (see Section 5 below for how we obtain these data).
Second, given these estimates, we use equation (21) to calculate what the distribution of
job-nding probabilities over segments would be if one or more of the wedges were zero
in all labor market segments. Finally, we use equations (22) and (23) to calculate the
contribution of mismatch to the aggregate job-nding probability and unemployment
rate.
The idea behind this procedure is that if we remove, for example, the worker-mobility
frictions, setting ^WMit equal to zero, but leave the job-mobility and wage-setting fric-
tions in place, then ^JMit and ^
WD
it would stay the same. A complication arises if the
wedges are correlated. Then, removing a friction does not necessarily decrease mismatch
and unemployment, but may increase it. This is simply because in a second-best envi-
ronment, di¤erent frictions may reinforce or counteract each other, so that removing a
friction may decrease e¢ ciency.15 Potentially, the correlations between ^WMit , ^
JM
it and
^WDit are informative about the frictions that maintain labor market mismatch. Empir-
ically however, we nd very little correlation, see Section 6.2; we therefore focus on a
simple variance decomposition between the three sources of mismatch.
Any correlation between the wedges means the variance decomposition of equation
(23) will depend on the order, in which we shut down the various sources of mismatch in
equation (21). To understand this point, it is important to realize that the contribution
of a friction is always relative to a baseline. We can estimate the contribution of a
particular friction to mismatch as the di¤erence between the aggregate job-nding rate
that would prevail without this friction, leaving all other frictions as they are in the
data, and the actual aggregate job-nding rate. Or, we can estimate this contribution
as the di¤erence between the aggregate job-nding rate that would prevail if only this
friction were present, and the aggregate job-nding rate in the no-mismatch allocation.
In general, the two approaches will give di¤erent answers, because the rst friction that
is shut down will shut down the covariance terms as well. In appendix C, we show that
15As an example, consider two otherwise identical labor market segments, one with high wages and
one with low wages. Suppose these wage di¤erentials can exist because of wage-setting frictions, but that
labor market tightness is nevertheless equal in both submarkets, because mobility costs prevent workers
and jobs from moving from one submarket to the other. Now suppose we were to remove the mobility
costs but leave the wage-setting frictions in place. Unemployed workers would move to the submarket
where wages are high, whereas vacancies would move to the submarket where wages are low. The result
would be a decrease in the aggregate job-nding rate and an increase in mismatch unemployment.
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the contribution of a friction that we remove includes the contribution of the covariance
of that friction with other frictions in place, whereas the contribution of a friction that we
introduce does not. Therefore, we calculate the contribution of each friction in both ways
and average it, attributing the covariance between two frictions in equal proportions to
each of the frictions. This approach, which is similar to a Shapley-Owen decomposition,
guarantees that our decomposition adds up to exactly 100% of mismatch unemployment.
The most important limitation of our approach is that we needed to assume that
parameter heterogeneity is time-invariant, in order to be able to identify the contribution
of mismatch to unemployment. If in reality there is time variation in unemployment
benets bit, vacancy maintenance costs it and/or matching e¢ ciency it then we will
incorrectly attribute the dispersion due to this heterogeneity to mismatch. Substituting
out for q^it, which is not directly observable, in equations (12), (13) and (15) using (14),
and taking deviations, we get the following expressions for the wedges we would measure
in this case.
p^it + S^
W
it = ^
WM
it + ^
WM
it (24)
S^Fit   1  p^it = ^JMit + ^JMit   ^MTit (25)
S^Wit   S^Fit = ^WDit (26)
The wage determination wedge is not a¤ected, but time-varying heterogeneity in un-
employment benets WMit = log (
u   bit) biases the contribution of worker mobil-
ity frictions, and time-varying heterogeneity in vacancy maintenance costs JMit =
log (v + g0 (vit;it)) and matching e¢ ciency MTit = (1= (1  )) log it is spuriously
attributed to job mobility frictions.
If we assume that the time variation in parameters is uncorrelated with the true
wedges, then time-varying parameter heterogeneity will lead to an upward bias in the es-
timated overall amount of mismatch, and in the contribution of worker mobility and job
mobility frictions, because V

^WMit + ^
WM
it

> V

^WMit

and V

^JMit + ^
JM
it   ^MTit

>
V

^JMit

. If the heterogeneity in these parameters comoves with the business cycle, then
the estimates for the cyclicality of total mismatch and the contribution of worker and job
mobility frictions will be a¤ected as well. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say much
more about the bias we should expect without data on these parameters. However,
in Section 6.4, we present estimates with additional controls for time-varying worker
heterogeneity. To the extent that parameter heterogeneity is correlated with observable
worker characteristics, we would expect that controlling for these characteristics would
alleviate the bias due to time-varying parameter heterogeneity. We take the nding that
controls for worker characteristics a¤ect our results very little as suggestive evidence that
time-varying parameter heterogeneity is not a great concern in practice.
16
5 Data and Measurement
To implement the mismatch accounting exercise described in the previous section, we
need empirical measures of the job-nding rate pit, the worker-nding rate qit, worker
surplus SWit , which is closely related to wages, and rm surplus S
F
it , closely related
to prots, for submarkets of the labor market. In this section, we describe how we
obtain these measures. In Section 5.1, we describe the micro-data we use to extract
disaggregated measures for nding rates, wages, and prots. Then, in Sections 5.2 and
5.3, we describe how we use these data to calculate the theoretical measures we need for
our accounting exercise. Here, we need to make some auxiliary assumptions, which we
revisit after discussing our results in Section 6.4.
The rst empirical di¢ culty is how to dene a labor market segment or submarket.
A submarket of the labor market is dened as a subset of unemployed workers or vacant
jobs that are similar to each other but di¤erent from other workers or jobs, so that each
unemployed worker and each rm with a vacant job searches in one submarket only. In
our theoretical framework, we assumed that submarkets are mutually exclusive, so that
two workers who are searching for some of the same jobs are searching for all of the same
jobs, and if a worker is searching for a job, then that job is searching for that worker. In
practice, these assumptions are likely to be violated, unless we dene submarkets as very
small and homogeneous segments of the labor markets, based on geographic location as
well as the skill set required to do a job.
We use 51 U.S. states (including Washington, D.C.) to explore geographic mismatch
and around 37 industries to explore skill mismatch.16 This choice is driven by data
limitations and follows other empirical contributions in this literature (S¸ahin, Song,
Topa, and Violante (2014), Barnichon and Figura (2015)). Unfortunately, it is not
possible to use very small submarkets, because we would have too little data about each
submarket.17 For our estimates of overall mismatch, we also use three-digit occupations,
as S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) do, which arguably better categorize similarly
skilled jobs than do industry-oriented groupings; however, because data on prots by
occupation are not available, we cannot use these data for our decomposition.
5.1 Data Sources
Our primary data sources are the January 1979 to December 2015 basic monthly les of
the Current Population Survey (CPS) administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).18 We limit the sample to wage and salary workers between 16 and 65 years of
16We have 37 industries based on the SIC classication for the 1979-1997 period and 38 industries
based on the NAICS classication for the 1998-2015 period.
17Shimer (2007), for instance, suggests using the interaction of 800 occupations and 922 geographic
areas (362 MSAs plus 560 rural areas), which gives a total of 740; 000 submarkets. In our dataset, we
have information on about 150; 000 workers in a given year, so that we would have 1 datapoint for each
5 submarkets.
18We mostly rely on data provided by IPUMS (Flood, King, Ruggles, and Warren (2017)), but
complement these with data provided by the NBER to add the variables unemployment duration (DU-
RUNEMP) before 1994 and weekly earnings (EARNWEEK) before 1989.
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age, with non-missing data for state and industry classication. From the basic monthly
les we construct job-nding and separation rates. We aggregate the monthly data to
an annual time series in order to increase the number of observations. Our estimates of
nding and separation rates are based on about 750; 000 observations per year. From
the outgoing rotation groups, we get wages, calculated as usual weekly earnings divided
by usual weekly hours. Again, we aggregate the data to an annual time series, ending up
with a sample of about 160; 000 workers per year. Table 2 in appendix F lists the states
and industries we use and summarizes the number of observations used to calculate the
job-nding and separation rates and the average wage for the state-year and industry-
year cells. The average cell size for job-nding and separation rates is 858 per year for
the state-level data, and 1124 per year for the industry-level data; the smallest cells have
159 and 15 observations, respectively.
Data on prots by state and industry come from the National Income and Product
Account (NIPA) data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use gross
operating surplus per employee as our measure of prots. Gross operating surplus equals
value added, net of taxes and subsidies, minus compensation of employees. Net operating
surplus equals gross operating surplus minus consumption of xed capital; it is the
measure of business income from the NIPA that is closest to economic prots. Because
data on net operating surplus are not available at the state and industry levels, we use
gross operating surplus, thus e¤ectively assuming that xed capital does not di¤er much
across labor market segments. Under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas production
technology and perfect capital markets, prots per employee equal the marginal prots
from hiring an additional worker.19
In 1998, the industry classication system changed from the SIC to the NAICS.
Using a consistent industry classication over the entire sample period would force us
to aggregate at a higher level. Instead, we use the SIC classication until 1997, and the
NAICS from 1998 onwards, using approximately the same number of industries in both
subsamples. This allows us to calculate comparable cross-industry variances for p^i, q^i,
S^Wi , and S^
F
i over the full sample period. When adjusting for parameter heterogeneity,
as described in Section 4.2, we subtract industry-specic time-series averages separately
for the 1979-1997 and 1998-2015 periods.
We deate nominal data on wages and prots using the CPI provided by the BEA
(series CUUR00000SA0). Using an aggregate price deator does not directly a¤ect our
results, because we use only the cross-sectional variation in the data, but it is important
for the heterogeneity correction, which relies on subtracting the time-series mean for
each segment. As a robustness check, we also show results for unemployment due to
geographic mismatch using a state-specic deator provided by Berry, Fording, and
19Let Y = AKL1  be output, produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology from capital
K and labor L. Prots (or net operating surplus) are given by  = Y   rK   wL, where r is the
rental rate of capital, and w is the wage rate. The marginal prots from an additional employee are
d=dL = (1  )Y=L w, where dK=dL = 0 by the envelope theorem if capital is chosen optimally by
the rm. Prots per employee are =L = Y=L  rK=L w. If capital markets are frictionless, then the
rental rate equals the marginal product of capital, r = Y=K, so that =L = (1  )Y=L w = d=dL.
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Hanson (2000), which is available until 2007.
Finally, we need to make assumptions about the unemployment share of the matching
function  and the discount rate r. In our baseline results, we assume  = 0:72, as in
Shimer (2005), and explore the robustness of our results to setting  = 0:5 as in S¸ahin,
Song, Topa, and Violante (2014), which is at the other end of the plausible range of
estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We set the annual discount rate r = 0:04,
but this assumption matters very little for the results.
5.2 Finding and Separation Rates
We calculate job-nding and separation rates of workers from the unemployment rates in
two subsequent months and the number of newly separated workers (short-term unem-
ployed) in the CPS. This way to measure worker ows, suggested by Shimer (2012), has
the advantage that it is not subject to time-aggregation bias.20 We show that our results
are robust if we instead calculate job-nding and separation rates from the number of
workers transitioning between unemployment and employment from matched CPS data,
see Section 6.4.
Workers are attributed to the state where they live and the industry where they
work. We attribute unemployed workers, for whom we lack information on industry, to
the industry in which they last held a job, following standard practice at the BLS. This
assumption is not consistent with our model, which would attribute unemployed workers
to the industry in which they are searching for a job. We address this concern with a
novel way of constructing segment-specic job nding rates, attributing unemployed
workers to the industry in which they eventually nd a job, see appendix G. We show
in Section 6.4 that our results are robust to this alternative approach.
To calculate worker-nding rates of rms, we would need rm-level data, which are
available from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), but only from
the year 2000 onwards. To obtain data on worker-nding rates for a longer sample
period, we use equation (19) to construct data for worker-nding rates of rms q^it from
data on job-nding rates of workers p^it.
5.3 Match Surplus
As derived in appendices A.2.1 and A.2.2, the surplus of a match to the worker and the
rm is given by a Bellman equation,
(1 + r)Skit = Ety
k
it+1 + (1  i)EtSkit+1 (27)
where k 2 fW;Fg and ykit is the ow payo¤ from the match, which equals wit   u for
workers and f (nit; zit) wit v for rms. We observe match payo¤s ykit and separation
20 In February 1994, there was a change in the way unemployment duration is reported in the CPS.
To correct for this change, we multiply the o¢ cial short-term unemployment rate by a factor 1:1579 in
months from February 1994 onwards, as suggested by Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009).
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rates i in our dataset, and use these data and equation (27) to calculate match surplus
for the worker and rm, SWit and S
F
it respectively.
21 In order to do this, we need to make
assumptions on the evolution of these variables after a match is created.
For our exercise, what matters is the dispersion in surplus across submarkets of the
labor markets. Dispersion in surplus is sensitive to the persistence in payo¤s and to
the segment-specic separation probabilities. The persistence of payo¤s matters be-
cause match surplus equals the expected net present value of all future payo¤s from the
match. If payo¤s are very persistent, then current payo¤di¤erentials will persist into the
future, thus generating more dispersion in the expected net present value. Persistence
in separation rates matters as well, because it determines to what extent the separation
probabilities are segment-specic.
We assume match payo¤s follow rst-order autoregressive processes that revert to
the average across all submarkets. The rst-order autocorrelation in wages is 0:94 per
year in the state-level data and 0:64 in the industry-level data based on the NAICS
classication.22 This is consistent with Blanchard and Katz (1992), who nd an auto-
correlation of 0:94 across U.S. states, and Alvarez and Shimer (2011), who nd 0:90 for
75 industries at the three-digit level of disaggregation (CES data, 1990-2008). Autocor-
relation in prots is 0:96 in the state-level data and 0:72 in the industry-level data. Since
wages and prots are close to a random walk in the state-level data, we use this as our
baseline.23 For industries, we assume monthly mean reversion in wages and prots of
0:037 and 0:027, respectively, consistent with the observed autocorrelations. In Section
6.4, we show that our results are robust to these assumptions.
In the model, separation rates are constant over time, and this is our baseline.
However, we explore the robustness of our results to higher degrees of mean reversion,
because, in the data, separation rates are quite far from a random walk: the rst-order
autocorrelation is 0:61 per year in the state level data and 0:50 in the industry-level
data. Therefore, we allow separation rates to follow an (independent) autoregressive
process as well.
Using the stochastic processes for match payo¤s ykit and separation rates it, we can
solve equation (27) recursively to obtain match surplus. For convenience, we approx-
imate around the separation rate following a random walk so that we can obtain an
explicit expression for the solution, see appendix D for the derivation,
Skit '
(r + it) (r + it + )
(r + it) (r + it + ) +  (1 + r + it)
 
t   it
  ykt
r + it
+
ykit   ykt
r + it + ky

(28)
21We also need values for the parameters u and v. We assume v = 0 to reect free entry of
vacancies. We also set u = 0 for symmetry, but explore the robustness of our results to this assumption
in Section 6.4.
22We report simple rst-order autocorrelations in this paragraph. However, the persistence in the
data is very similar and, if anything, higher if we use the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable in
a dynamic panel regression with xed-e¤ects.
23Strictly speaking, what matters is not the persistence in average wages and prots, but the per-
sistence of wages and prots of a given match. However, as shown by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens
(2013) and Kudlyak (2014), wages paid out over the duration of a match are more persistent than
average wages, so, these estimates, if anything, understate the autocorrelation in wages.
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where ykt is the average of y
k
it across segments i. In this expression,  and 
k
y denote the
mean reversion in separation probabilities and match payo¤s, so that the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient in these variables equals 1   and 1  ky , respectively. The approximation
is good if separation rates are persistent, i.e. for  close to zero.
If match payo¤s follow a random walk, ky = 0, and turnover is constant,  =
0, as in our baseline, then match surplus is the annuity value of the current payo¤,
Skit = y
k
it= (r + it), evaluated at an e¤ective discount rate which includes not only the
rate of time preference, but also the separation probability. The higher the wage in a
submarket, the higher is the surplus of having a job in that submarket. The more likely
it is to lose that job in the future that is, the higher is itthe lower is the surplus.
6 Results
We start the description of our results with our estimates for the total e¤ect of mismatch
on the level and the cyclicality of unemployment. Then, we turn to the decomposition
of mismatch into its three sources. We explore how well no-mismatch equilibrium con-
ditions (7), (8) and (10) hold in the data in Section 6.2, and we present the results of
our mismatch accounting exercise in Section 6.3.
6.1 Mismatch Unemployment
Figure 1 plots the unemployment rate that is due to mismatch across occupations,
across states (panel A) and across industries (panel B) over the 1979-2015 period. For
comparison, the graphs also show the overall unemployment rate over the same period,
although on a di¤erent scale. We will use the series in these graphs to address the
questions of how large the impact of labor market mismatch is on unemployment, and
how it uctuates over the business cycle.
Unemployment due to mismatch across three-digit occupation-state cells averages
almost 1 percentage point. Comparing to an average unemployment rate of around 7%,
it is clear that occupational mismatch is responsible for a substantial part (around 13%)
of unemployment. Mismatch across states and industries is much smaller at 0:05 to 0:1
percentage points, or 0:7 to 1:5% of unemployment, respectively. Clearly the level of
disaggregation matters for the observed amount of mismatch, and there is likely to be
substantial mismatch within states and within industries. However, the cyclical pattern
of mismatch unemployment looks similar across occupations, states, industries. It is
worthwhile, therefore, to further explore mismatch across states and industries, as a
proxy for overall labor market mismatch.24
Figure 1 clearly shows that the cyclical uctuations in mismatch unemployment
are very similar to those in the overall unemployment rate. Mismatch unemployment
24An additional argument why mismatch across industries and states may be a reasonable proxy for
mismatch across occupations is decribed in appendix E, where we use a back-of-the-envelope correction
for aggregation to argue that the estimates for mismatch across states and industries imply a level of
mismatch that is of a similar magnitude as the observed mismatch across occupations.
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closely follows the business cycle, rising in the 1982, 1991, 2001 and 2008 recessions,
and declining slowly during the recoveries, as does the unemployment rate. The relative
amplitude of these uctuations is very similar to those in the total unemployment rate.
There is no evidence that mismatch unemployment is less cyclical or more persistent
than the overall unemployment rate. Finally, there is no indication that the fraction of
the increase in unemployment in the Great Recession that was due to mismatch was
larger than in other recessions.
To obtain a summary statistic for the importance of mismatch to the overall unem-
ployment rate, we regress mismatch unemployment uMMt on a constant and the overall
unemployment rate ut in deviation from its average u.
uMMt = 0u+ 1 (ut   u) (29)
The intercept 0 in this regression measures the contribution of mismatch to the average
level of unemployment, whereas the slope coe¢ cient 1 measures the contribution of
mismatch to uctuations in unemployment. We report both statistics in Table 1, see
the rows labelled Mismatch across occupations and Baseline.The contribution of
mismatch to uctuations in unemployment is roughly similar to the contribution to the
level of unemployment: 20% for mismatch across occupations, and 3:2% and 0:7% for
mismatch across states and industries, respectively.
Figure 2 shows an alternative presentation of these results on the contribution of
mismatch to unemployment for mismatch across states (panel A) and industries (panel
B). Here, we plot log ut   log ut ' (ut   ut ) =ut, which measures unemployment due
to mismatch as a fraction of the overall unemployment rate. The four lines in these
graphs represent the exact contribution of mismatch to unemployment, calculated using
equations (51) and (53) in appendix B, and the approximation using equation (23),
with and without controlling for parameter heterogeneity. It is clear from these graphs
that the log-normal approximation used to derive equation (23) is very good. It is also
clear that controlling for parameter heterogeneity is important. Without these controls,
the contribution of mismatch to unemployment is about two (for states) to three (for
industries) times larger. Moreover, the e¤ect of parameter heterogeneity changes over
time and with the business cycle. Of course, as explained in Section 4.2, it is possible that
by taking out parameter heterogeneity, we are also removing some ine¢ cient dispersion
in job-nding rates. Therefore, our estimates for mismatch unemployment should be
thought of as a lower bound. There is no obvious cyclical pattern in the graphs of
the relative contribution of mismatch to unemployment, conrming our nding that
mismatch comoves with the overall unemployment rate.
Our estimates are broadly in line with S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014),
who employ di¤erent data and conclude that geographic mismatch is very small, but
industry-level mismatch (at the two-digit level) explains around 14% of the increase in
unemployment in the Great Recession. The estimates in their Figure 3 imply a similar
contribution of mismatch to the level of unemployment (although the authors do not
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report this in their text). Consistent with our argument that aggregation importantly
biases the estimate of the contribution of mismatch, S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante
(2014) also nd that when they disaggregate further, to three-digit occupation level, the
contribution of mismatch increases to 29%. However, we emphasize that our estimates of
the contribution of mismatch to the level of unemployment are rough, and the estimates
in S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2014) are the more credible ones. The reason is
that while we use data on worker ows from the CPS, S¸ahin, Song, Topa, and Violante
(2014) also use disaggregated data on vacancies from JOLTS and HWOL, which are
available only from December 2000 and May 2005, respectively. The contribution of the
current study is in the estimates of the sources of mismatch, to which we now turn.
6.2 Deviations from the No-Mismatch Conditions
We now turn to the most interesting part of our results: the decomposition of mismatch
unemployment into the sources of the mismatch. The idea behind our accounting exer-
cise is to compare the relationship between job-nding rates and worker surplus, between
job-lling rates and rm surplus, and between worker and rm surpluses to the predic-
tions of the model for these relationships in the absence of mismatch. We will start,
therefore, by exploring what these relationships look like in the data.
Figure 3 shows scatterplots of states around the worker-mobility, job-mobility and
wage-determination conditions. These graphs are for 2010, but they look similar for
other years. Deviations across states from the no-mismatch conditions are large and
systematic. Nevertheless, the positive correlation between worker and rm surpluses
predicted by wage-setting condition (10), and the negative correlation between rm
surplus and job-lling rates predicted by the worker-mobility condition (7) are somewhat
visible in the data. These graphs suggest that frictions preventing rms from moving
jobs across states play the most important role as a source of mismatch. Figure 4 shows
similar results for the equilibrium conditions across industries. The plots look similar
to those for states, and again suggest that job-mobility frictions are the most important
source of mismatch.
Scatter plots around the no-mismatch equilibrium conditions may not give the full
picture if the deviations from these conditions are correlated. However, in practice this
is not much of a concern. The correlation between the wedges in the worker-mobility
condition ^WMit and the wedges in the job-mobility condition ^
JM
it is on average  0:23
for states, 0:07 for (SIC) industries over the 1979-1997 period, and  0:14 for (NAICS)
industries 1998-2015. Given these low correlations, it makes sense to think of barriers
to worker and job mobility as separate frictions.
6.3 Sources of Mismatch
Figure 5 shows the results of our mismatch accounting exercise described in Section 4.
The gure shows the evolution over time of the three sources of unemployment due to
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mismatch across states and industries.
Mismatch across states is mainly generated by job-mobility frictions, with a smaller
contribution of worker-mobility frictions and virtually no role for wage-setting frictions.
Mismatch across industries looks very similar, with a possibly even smaller role for
worker-mobility frictions.
To summarize the contribution of each source of mismatch to the unemployment
rate, we regress mismatch unemployment due to each source on the total unemployment
rate due to mismatch (in deviation from its mean).
uXXt = 
XX
0 u
MM + XX1
 
uMMt   uMM

(30)
where XX stands for the source of mismatch, i.e., XX 2 fWM;JM;WDg.25 The in-
tercept in this regression measures the contribution of each of the frictions to the average
level of mismatch unemployment, so that XX0 = u
XX=uMM , whereas the slope coe¢ -
cient measures the contribution of mismatch to uctuations in unemployment. The slope
coe¢ cient captures both the degree of correlation of unemployment due to a particular
source of mismatch with the total mismatch unemployment rate and the size of uctua-
tions in mismatch due to that source, i.e., XX1 = corr
 
uXXt ; u
MM
t

sd
 
uXXt

=sd
 
uMMt

.
Note that because uWMt + u
JM
t + u
WD
t = u
MM
t , the contributions of the three sources
to the total add up to one, i.e. WM0 + 
JM
0 + 
WD
0 = 1 and 
WM
1 + 
JM
1 + 
WD
1 = 1,
so that this is an exact decomposition.
Results of the mismatch accounting exercise are reported in Table 1. Barriers to job
mobility contribute 79% to the level of and 80% to the uctuations in mismatch across
states and 78% to the level and 65% to the uctuations of mismatch across industries.
Barriers to worker mobility are responsible for roughly a fourth of that: 20% of the level
and 19% of the uctuations of mismatch across states, and 19% of the level and 27% of
the uctuations of mismatch across industries. The contribution of wage-setting frictions
to mismatch is virtually zero, both for the level of mismatch and for its uctuations,
and both across states and across industries.
6.4 Robustness
A number of assumptions were necessary to construct the data needed for our analysis.
In this subsection we explore the robustness of our results to these assumptions. We
summarize the results in terms of the contribution of mismatch to the level and uctua-
tions of the overall unemployment rate, as explained in Section 6.1; and in terms of the
contribution of barriers to worker mobility, barriers to job mobility and deviations from
the e¢ cient wage determination equation to labor market mismatch, as described in
Section 6.3. These summary statistics are presented for a number of robustness checks
in Table 1.26 In the top and bottom panels of this table, the rst line shows our baseline
25uMMt = (log ut   log ut ) ut, where log ut log ut as in (22) and (23), and uXXt is calculated similarly.
26A few entries in the table are negative. The contribution of a friction to mismatch unemployment
may be negative because the correlation between deviations from the di¤erent no-mismatch conditions
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estimates for state-level and industry-level data, respectively.
For the construction of job-lling rates from job-nding rates, we made the assump-
tion that thematching technology is well described by a Cobb-Douglas matching function
with an elasticity of unemployment  of 0:72, see Sections 3.3 and 5.2. In the table, we
show the e¤ect of varying this elasticity from 0:5 or 0:8. A higher (lower) elasticity in-
creases (decreases) the concavity of the aggregate job-nding rate in the segment-specic
job-nding rates, see Section 4, and therefore increases (decreases) the estimated con-
tribution of mismatch to unemployment. This e¤ect is fairly strong for the estimates
for the overall amount of mismatch, but the decomposition into its sources is largely
una¤ected.
We used short-term unemployment to measure job-nding and separation rates, as
suggested by Shimer (2012). Our results are very similar if we instead measure worker
ows from transitions of workers between unemployment and employment using basic
monthly CPS data matched between subsequent months. In what is possibly the most
contentious assumption we made in measuring worker ows, we calculated job-nding
rates by industry of origin rather than by industry of destination. It is not possible
to calculate these rates in the same way by industry of destination, because we do not
have information about in which industry unemployed workers are searching for a job.
However, we can use matched CPS data, combined with information on unemployment
duration, to back out a rough measure of job-nding rates, see appendix G. This measure
is much noisier than our baseline measure, because it uses a smaller sample consisting
only of unemployed workers who nd a job within the sample. Nevertheless, the results
are very similar.
For the construction of match surpluses, we made a number of choices, among which
the assumptions that price deators are the same across states, see Section 5.1, that the
opportunity cost of an additional unemployed worker u equals zero, that match payo¤s
(wages or prots) follow an autoregressive process, and that match turnover is constant,
see Section 5.3. The next set of lines in the table explores the robustness of our results
to these assumptions. Since none of these assumptions a¤ect the observed dispersion in
job-nding rates, the estimates of the contribution of mismatch to unemployment are
not a¤ected, except for the state-specic price deators, which generate slightly more
dispersion and, therefore, a slightly higher estimate of mismatch unemployment.27 The
composition of mismatch into its sources is a¤ected, but the e¤ect is very small. To
explore the e¤ect of non-zero opportunity costs of unemployment, we vary the home
production of non-participants u from 0 to 20, 50 and 70% of the global average wage.
For u  50%, this leads to negative worker surplus in some industries in some year.
When this happens, we drop the entire industry from the sample, which explains why
also the contribution of overall mismatch changes in these cases. Despite the changing
sample, however, the results for both the overall level of mismatch and its composition
is not exactly zero.
27We use a state-specic deator provided by Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000), which is available
until 2007.
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change very little.
For some assumptions, we cannot directly explore robustness, but we can argue they
are unlikely to a¤ect our ndings. Measurement error, while substantial, clearly does not
drive our results. Classical measurement error would generate non-systematic deviations
from all equilibrium relationships, whereas we nd the wage-setting conditions, and,
to a lesser extent, the worker-mobility condition in the data, while deviations from
all three conditions look systematic. A similar argument can be made for on-the-job
search. If workers are searching for a new job while employed, this increases workers
match surplus, but, given observed wages and job-nding rates, this e¤ect is not taken
into account in the way we construct match surplus, see Section 5.3. If on-the-job
search intensity is the same for all workers and all rms, then this does not a¤ect
our results, because we work in deviations from the cross-sectional mean. If on-the-
job search intensity varies systematically with the value of a match, then on-the-job
search would increase or decrease the slope of the worker-mobility curve, (mis)leading
us to conclude that worker-mobility frictions are giving rise to mismatch. For the same
reason, our ndings cannot be driven by workers looking for jobs in surrounding regions
and occupations as Marinescu and Rathelot (2016) show they do, because this e¤ect
would also make it less likely to nd a worker-mobility condition in the data.
A more serious issue is that of discouraged workers. It is possible that unemployed
workers leave labor market segments with low surplus (wages), not by moving to a
di¤erent labor market segment, but by dropping out of the labor force. This mechanism
would make it seem like the no-arbitrage condition for worker mobility is satised, while
there is substantial mismatch, leading not to unemployment but to non-employment.
Unfortunately, without better data, there is very little we can do to explore this issue.
Finally, we explore the e¤ect of heterogeneity. As described in Section 4.2, in our
baseline we control for time-invariant heterogeneity by removing the segment-specic
time-series averages from p^it, S^Wit , q^it and S^
F
it , similar to controlling for xed e¤ects in
a regression. Next, we explore the robustness of our results if we control for observed
worker heterogeneity. If demographic characteristics of the workforce change over time,
removing time-series averages does not control for this e¤ect. We address this concern
by adjusting worker- and job-nding rates, separation rates and earnings for observ-
able worker characteristics, by regressing earnings as well as the likelihood of becoming
unemployed and experiencing short-term unemployment on potential labor market expe-
rience (age minus years of schooling minus 6), and dummies for educational attainment,
gender, race, marital status.28 For each year and for each state or industry, we then
impute the tted values for a hypothetical worker with average demographics. When
we do this, our results change very little.
28For wages we use a log-linear specication, as is common in the literature, see Card (1999). In order
to get tted values for wages, we use the tted values for log wages and apply the correction factor
suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
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7 Conclusions
Mismatch unemployment is unemployment due to ine¢ cient dispersion in labor market
conditions across submarkets. We proposed an accounting framework using two arbi-
trage equations and an e¢ cient wage determination equation that allows us to estimate
mismatch unemployment and decompose it into its sources. This framework uses data
on the values of unemployment and vacancies, rather than on their quantities, as inputs;
thus, available data allowed us to present estimates for the 1979-2009 period, going fur-
ther back in time than previous studies. More importantly, this paper is the rst to
report on the causes of mismatch.
We argue that mismatch was quantitatively important in the United States over the
last four decades, with mismatch across detailed occupations explaining around 13%
of unemployment. The cyclical behavior of mismatch unemployment is very similar to
that of the overall unemployment rate. This nding is driven by the fact that dispersion
in labor market conditions across states and industries moves closely with the business
cycle. The unemployment that derives from this dispersion is as cyclical as the overall
unemployment rate, and it is no more persistent. As a corollary, the nature of the
increase in unemployment in the Great Recession is no di¤erent from previous recessions,
although it is of course more severe.
The underlying frictions that causes mismatch to persist are predominantly barriers
to job mobility, which explains between 65% and 80% of mismatch across both states and
industries. The main reason for these frictions is probably the production technology,
which allows only for limited possibilities for substituting one type of worker for another.
Barriers to entry into particular industries, or lack of industry-specic know-how or
brand recognition may also play a role.
We nd a much smaller role for worker-mobility frictions, which account only for
about 20% of mismatch. This nding is perhaps surprising in light of the debate on
policies aimed at increasing worker mobility, see e.g., Katz (2010). On the other hand,
the nding is consistent with the observation that U.S. workers are quite exible, and
are willing, for instance, to move between states in order to nd a job (Molloy, Smith,
Trezzi, and Wozniak (2016)).
Wage-setting frictions play virtually no role for mismatch. This nding is consis-
tent with the exibility of the U.S. market, which is characterized by exible wages,
particularly for newly hired workers (Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013)), and by
low levels of unionization since the 1980s (Farber and Western (2002)). We make no
claim that our results apply to di¤erent countries or di¤erent time periods, and it is
quite possible that in European countries, for instance, both worker-mobility frictions
and wage-setting frictions are much more important due to language barriers and more
rigid wage-setting institutions.
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Table 1.A
Robustness Analysis, mismatch across states
MMU Sources of MMU
level cycle level cycle
Mismatch across occupations 13:3 20:0
Mismatch across states WM JM WD WM JM WD
Baseline 1:5 3:2 20 79 1 19 80 1
Elasticity matching function,  = 0:5 0:6 1:3 36 62 2 34 64 2
____,  = 0:6 0:9 1:9 29 70 2 27 71 2
____,  = 0:7 1:4 2:9 22 77 1 20 78 1
____,  = 0:8 2:3 4:9 14 85 1 14 86 1
Finding rates using transitions 1:6 2:8 34 64 1 33 65 2
State-specic deators 1:3 2:8 23 78  1 26 72 1
Opportunity cost job seeking, u = 0:2 w 1:5 3:2 20 79 2 18 80 2
____, u = 0:5 w 1:5 3:2 18 79 2 15 80 5
____, u = 0:7 w 1:5 3:2 16 79 6 8 80 12
Mean-reversion payo¤s, y = 0 1:5 3:2 20 79 1 19 80 1
____, y = 0:02 1:5 3:2 21 78 1 20 79 1
____, y = 0:04 1:5 3:2 21 78 1 21 78 1
____, y = 0:06 1:5 3:2 21 78 0 22 78 1
____, y = 0:08 1:5 3:2 21 78 0 22 78 1
Mean-reversion separation rate,  = 0 1:5 3:2 20 79 1 19 80 1
____,  = 0:02 1:5 3:2 23 76 1 21 78 1
____,  = 0:04 1:5 3:2 24 75 1 22 77 1
____,  = 0:06 1:5 3:2 24 74 1 23 76 1
____,  = 0:08 1:5 3:2 25 74 1 23 76 1
Control for observed worker heterogeneity 1:4 2:9 25 75 1 24 75 1
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Table 1.B
Robustness Analysis, mismatch across industries
MMU Sources of MMU
level cycle level cycle
Mismatch across occupations 13:3 20:0
Mismatch across industries WM JM WD WM JM WD
Baseline 0:7 0:7 19 78 4 27 65 8
Elasticity matching function,  = 0:5 0:3 0:3 33 60 7 49 37 14
____,  = 0:6 0:4 0:4 27 68 5 39 49 11
____,  = 0:7 0:6 0:6 20 76 4 29 62 9
____,  = 0:8 1:1 1:1 13 84 3 20 75 6
Finding rates using transitions 0:8 0:5 27 71 1 30 65 5
Finding rates by destination 0:9 1:0 26 75  1 24 75 1
Opportunity cost job seeking, u = 0:2 w 0:7 0:7 18 78 4 27 65 8
____, u = 0:5 w 0:8 0:9 17 78 5 28 64 8
____, u = 0:7 w 0:9 0:8 17 78 5 24 71 5
Mean-reversion payo¤s, y = 0:02 0:7 0:7 18 78 4 27 64 9
____, y = 0:04 0:7 0:7 19 78 3 27 66 7
____, y = 0:06 0:7 0:7 19 78 3 28 67 5
____, y = 0:08 0:7 0:7 19 79 2 28 68 4
Mean-reversion separation rate,  = 0 0:7 0:7 19 78 4 27 65 8
____,  = 0:02 0:7 0:7 24 72 4 29 63 8
____,  = 0:04 0:7 0:7 26 71 4 29 63 8
____,  = 0:06 0:7 0:7 26 70 4 28 64 8
____,  = 0:08 0:7 0:7 26 70 4 28 64 8
Control for observed worker heterogeneity 0:6 0:8 21 73 6 28 58 15
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Figure 1
Mismatch unemployment
A. Across US states
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B. Across industries
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Unemployment due to mismatch across occupations, states and industries, calculated
as explained in Section 4.3. The dashed line shows the actual unemployment rate for
comparison.
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Figure 2
Unemployment due to mismatch as a percentage of total unemployment
A. Across US states
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B. Across industries
0
1
2
3
4
5
1979 1985 1991 1997 2003 2009 2015
mismatch unemployment (% total) approx
mismatch unemployment (% total) (fixed effects) approx (fixed effects)
Percentage increase in the unemployment rate due to mismatch, with and without con-
trolling for heterogeneity, and approximation as explained in Section 4.
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Figure 3
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage determination curves across US states
A. Worker mobility condition
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B. Job mobility condition
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C. Wage setting condition
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Lines represent the equilibrium relations corresponding to a labor market without any
mismatch. Data are for 2010.
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Figure 4
Worker mobility, job mobility and wage determination curves across industries
A. Worker mobility condition
TEX
INS
ENT
OIL
MET
CHE
FIN
ELC
CEM
MMA
EDU
FUR
HOS
MAC
HEA
SOC
MIN
VEH
PAP
FSV
CON
REN
WHO
RETACC
PUB
MNR
INF
LUM
RES
COM
PSV
FOO
ASV
TRA
RUB
MSV
UTI
-.2
0
.2
.4
w
or
ke
r s
ur
pl
us
-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2
job finding rate
B. Job mobility condition
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Lines represent the equilibrium relations corresponding to a labor market without any
mismatch. Data are for 2010.
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Figure 5
Sources of labor market mismatch
A. Across US states
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The thicker line is our baseline estimate for the aggregate e¤ect of mismatch as in Figure
2. The other lines show the contribution of worker mobility costs (WM), job mobility
costs (JM) and wage setting frictions (WD) to mismatch, see Section 4.
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